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Abstract 
 
This essay sketches some contours of what we think can reasonably be called New 
Austrian macro theory. By New Austrian, macro we mean a style of theorizing that 
incorporates the core of traditional or Old Austrian macro and pushes that core in new 
directions by using new analytical tools and methods. We would note that New Austrian 
is not some invention or construction de novo, but is a product of blending some 
traditional Austrian insights and formulations with new analytical formulations that were 
never part of the Austrian tradition but which can multiply the analytical oomph of that 
tradition. In this essay, we explain that the traditional Austrian macro theory suffers not 
from analytical wrong-headedness but from an underdevelopment of those 
complementary pieces of intellectual capital that would render Austrian macro once 
again a significant player in the efforts of economists to theorize about the properties of 
economic systems in their entirety.  
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New Austrian Macro Theory: A Call for Inquiry 
This essay sketches some contours of what we think can reasonably be called New 
Austrian macro theory. By New Austrian macro we mean a style of theorizing that 
incorporates the core of traditional or Old Austrian macro and pushes that core in new 
directions by using new analytical tools and methods. We would note that New Austrian 
is not some invention or construction de novo, but is a product of blending some 
traditional Austrian insights and formulations with new analytical formulations that were 
never part of the Austrian tradition but which can multiply the analytical oomph of that 
tradition. In this essay, we explain that the traditional Austrian macro theory suffers not 
from analytical wrong-headedness but from an underdevelopment of those 
complementary pieces of intellectual capital that would render Austrian macro once 
again a significant player in the efforts of economists to theorize about the properties of 
economic systems in their entirety.  
 This introductory essay is followed by five papers from young scholars who are 
well versed in the traditional Austrian approach to macro theory, as well as being filled 
with ideas about how to proceed along different theoretical lines that would extend the 
traditional Austrian insights in sufficiently new directions to qualify as New Austrian 
macro theory. Originally, these papers were presented at the November 2015 meetings 
of the Society for Development of Austrian Economics, and have since undergone 
revision in response to editorial suggestions and criticisms. The authors are either 
current or past students at George Mason University, and with one of those students 
having as a co-author a current faculty member at George Mason University. These 
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papers tackle problems and offer insights that come into the analytical foreground within 
the New Austrian vision for macro or systems theorizing.  
 In “Toward a New Austrian Macroeconomics,” Vipin P. Veetil and Lawrence H. 
White present a wide-ranging comparison of points of similarity and difference between 
their vision of a New Austrian macroeconomics and standard macro framework 
grounded in the DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model of a 
macroeconomy. In “Playing at Markets: A New Austrian Perspective on Macroeconomic 
Policy,” Alexander William Salter explains how orthodox expositions of macro policy 
create a form of shell game in deflecting the attention of observers away from the micro-
level interactions out of which macro variables emerge. In “Dynamic Coordinating Non-
Equilibrium,” Santiago Gangotena sets forth an alternative to the DSGE model wherein 
generally coordinated patterns of economic activity arise within a generative or non-
equilibrium scheme of modeling. In “The Unresolved Problem of Gratuitous Credit in 
Austrian Banking Theory,” Raymond Niles probes some points of controversy in 
Austrian banking theory over whether elasticity in the supply of money is a modest or a 
severe source of economic discoordination, or whether it might actually have socially 
beneficial properties in facilitating experimentation. In “Entrepreneurship, Search Costs, 
and a Realist Construct of Rationality in an Agent-based Economy,” James Caton 
explores different approaches to rationality in individual action in a manner that is 
congruent with continual experimentation and the injection of novelty into non-
equilibrium but generally coordinated processes.  
 Standard Austrian macro theory is exemplified by Mises (1912) and Hayek 
(1932, 1935), and is presented systematically by Horwitz (2000) and Garrison (2001). 
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This theory starts from systemic or general equilibrium within a Walrasian scheme of 
thought, and asks how to explain observed departures from systemic equilibrium. With 
systemic equilibrium being presumed to be the normal state of affairs, the analytical 
challenge is to give an economically intelligible account of the booms and busts that are 
recurring features of the historical record. Standard Austrian macro has some valuable 
features that can still be incorporated valuably into the rest of economic theory, but it 
also has some features that prevent such incorporation, and which at the same time run 
contrary to the deepest of Austrian intuitions about economic theory. We start this 
introductory essay by identifying what we regard as the best quality of standard Austrian 
macro theory, after which we identify what we regard as the worst quality. After we 
identify what we regard as the best and the worst elements of traditional Austrian macro 
theory, we devote the rest of this essay to elaborating some particular schemes of 
thought that derive from our identification of the best and the worst, and which thereby 
point toward a New Austrian macro that offers the potential for once again becoming a 
significant player in scholarly examinations regarding the properties of economic 
systems in their entirety.  
 
The Best of the Austrian Macro Tradition: Structure of Production 
 In our judgment, the best element in the Austrian tradition of macro theorizing is 
its emphasis on the structure of production, in contrast to the customary use of a 
circular flow of economic activity. Within the circular flow conception of the economic 
process, everything is instantaneous and time is of no consequence. Inputs are applied 
and outputs derived, without the passing of time as being significant in any but a 
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notional sense. In sharp contrast, traditional Austrian theory insists upon a structure of 
production where some activities are directly involved in producing consumer goods 
while other activities are involved in producing capital goods that will facilitate the 
production of consumer goods in years to come. A key question in traditional Austrian 
theory is what determines the time-length of this structure of production. The answer is 
that it depends on the willingness of people to postpone current consumption relative to 
the gain in future consumption that people anticipate will result from that postponement.  
 A structure of production view of the economic process yields several insights 
that unavoidably are hidden from a circular flow view. One is an appreciation of the 
significance of the interest rate as exerting an influence throughout the entire social 
structure of production. The interest rate is not merely the price of money, the price of 
loans, or of any other singular item or market. It is rather something that shapes the 
entire pattern of production within a society, and it speaks to how it is that the 
orientation of people within a society toward present and future is of great economic 
significance. This significance comes readily into the foreground in the traditional 
Austrian framework, but it comes close to vanishing within the circular flow notion of 
economic activity.  
 Traditional Austrian macro started with conceptualizing an economic system as a 
structure of production and not a circular flow. A central feature of this conceptualization 
is that the activities of some enterprises are closer in time to the creation of consumer 
goods than are the activities of other enterprises. To be sure, this conceptualization 
reflects an objectification of the economic process. From the point of view of participants 
within the process, they operate inside a flow of activity where inputs enter a firm and 
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outputs exit a firm. Market transactions are everywhere, regardless of how they might 
be placed within a structure of production. Yet recognition that there is a temporal 
pattern to the structure of production is the most valuable distinguishing feature of 
traditional Austrian theory of the system of economic interaction as a whole. It is a very 
short step from a structure of production to Hayek’s (1937, 1945) recognition that the 
knowledge that accompanies and propels economic interaction is never assembled in 
one mind or place but rather is distributed throughout the universe of economic activity.  
 
The Worst of the Austrian Tradition: Societal Equilibrium  
Traditional Austrian macro, as conveyed by its theory of business cycles, 
sterilizes the central insight that a structure of production offers. This sterilization is 
illustrated cogently in Joseph Schumpeter’s (1912) Theory of Economic Development. 
There, Schumpeter offers a circular flow as a reduction from a structure of production 
under the presumption of systemic equilibrium. He illustrates this with a forest where 
saplings are planted in one year and mature trees harvested 40 years later. Assuming 
that the forest is part of a system in equilibrium, it is simpler to work with a circular flow 
where an input of saplings, capital, and labor yields mature trees.  
 To work with systemic equilibrium, even as just a point of analytical departure, is 
to eviscerate the central contributions of Austrian macro theory. With a circular flow, it 
appears sensible to posit an aggregate production function, as in macro growth theory, 
and use that theory to render statements about economic growth. Such statements 
would be nonsensical from within a structure of production, because from within this 
framework it would be necessary analytically to incorporate particular activities at 
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particular places within the structure of production. Doing this, however, cannot be 
undertaken at the macro level, for these are micro-level activities. It is meaningless to 
speak of increasing the supply of human capital or increasing the stock of knowledge. It 
is particular types of knowledge acquired by particular people within a particular 
structure of production that matters, and which can in no way be illuminated by working 
with circular flows. Yet a theorist who works with systemic equilibrium will find it 
needlessly complicated to insist on working with a structure of production.  
 To carry forward an analytical scheme based on a structure of production 
requires recognition that a non-equilibrium mode of analysis is the complementary piece 
of intellectual capital that is necessary to bring the structure of production to life, while 
also bringing life to Hayek’s ideas about divided and distributed knowledge. We should 
note, however, that to speak of a non-equilibrium mode of analysis is not to embrace 
disequilibrium theorizing. Disequilibrium theory is simply a negation of equilibrium 
theory, and a New Austrian theory would have no use for either. Hayek’s (1937, 1945) 
treatments of inherently incomplete knowledge are intellectual misfits within a 
framework of economic equilibrium.  
 
The Mixed-Metaphor Quality of Traditional Austrian Macro Theory 
 The traditional Austrian theory of the economy as an entirety has a mixed-
metaphor quality. At the micro level it places strong emphasis on divided and 
incomplete knowledge, and how economic interaction promotes the acquisition and use 
of knowledge. No single individual can describe all of the steps people must take at 
various dates to produce a pencil now, for doing that lies beyond human capacity. Yet 
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economic interaction within a societal framework governed by private property and 
freedom of contract enables the production of pencils, as well as all of the other things 
we take for granted, all of which are emergent products of human interaction and not 
direct products of some particular agent’s intelligence and foresight. By positing 
equilibrium at the societal level, the significance of a structure of production is lost, as is 
recognition that its operating features are emergent qualities of social interaction. While 
the structure of production occupies the analytical foreground in generating what is 
generally described as Austrian capital theory and Austrian cycle theory, conveying 
those ideas by embracing a Walrasian point of departure neuters the contributions that 
an emphasis on a structure of production could enable. Hence, the presumption of 
systemic equilibrium is what we regard as the worst quality of traditional Austrian macro 
theory.1  
 The marriage of a structure of production to a presumption of systemic 
equilibrium renders incoherent the work that a structure of production potentially can do. 
The familiar Hayekian triangle can illustrate the problem created by this mixed metaphor 
quality. Trees are planted in one year and harvested 20 years later. There is a structure 
of production through which saplings become harvested 20 years later and converted to 
lumber to be used in various wood-using activities and products. The passing of time is 
an integral feature of the production process.  
 How long trees will be left to grow before they are harvested depends on the 
relationship between the value of the added wood that the owners of that wood 
                                            
1
 For a useful account of the impediments caused by Schumpeter’s attempts to do justice to his underlying vision of the economic 
process by his reliance on the notion of equilibrium, see Graça Moura ([2002] 2015, 2014). On the significance of Hayek’s escape 
from the notion of equilibrium to the broader concept of social order, see Fleetwood ([1996] 2015). 
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anticipate will result from another year of growth and the willingness of those owners to 
forego the consumption that harvesting the trees would enable. The boom and bust 
character of traditional Austrian theorizing arises at this point in recognition of how 
banking systems can generate variability in the supply of money and credit without any 
change in the willingness of people to refrain from consumption. 
 The analytical point of departure for traditional Austrian macro is a structure of 
production that is consistent with the Walrasian notion of general equilibrium, only with a 
banking system added. Within the Walrasian scheme, relationships among entities 
operating at different points in the structure of production would be governed by the 
natural rate of interest. This rate of interest is not directly observable, but rather is a 
theoretical construction that creates a situation where no economic entity acts so as to 
shorten or lengthen the structure of production. When a banking system is introduced, a 
market rate of interest arises where the rate of interest equilibrates the supply of saving 
that individuals leave with banks and the demand for loans that other individuals present 
to banks. The problem of gratuitous credit, the topic of Raymond Niles’s paper for this 
symposium, arises at this point.  
 Suppose a banking system, perhaps enabled by a central bank, were to expand 
the supply of loans beyond what would have maintained the natural rate of interest. This 
expansion will depress the market rate of interest below the natural rate. In 
consequence, the demand for loans will expand. That expansion, moreover, will have a 
particular temporal structure that favors long-lived over short-lived projects. To illustrate, 
suppose borrowed money can be invested either in a project that matures in one year or 
in one that matures in two years. Suppose be rate of interest prior to credit expansion is 
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ten percent. Where the one-year project would have to be evaluated as worth at least 
$110 to appear worthwhile, the two-year project would have to be evaluated as worth at 
least $121, or ten percent more than the one-year project.  
  Suppose bank credit expansion reduces the market rate of interest to five 
percent. The one-year project would now appear valuable so long as it was projected to 
return at least $105. The credit expansion will thus increase the absolute desire to 
expand one-year projects. The two-year project, however, will now appear profitable so 
long as it was projected to return at least $110.25. While the credit expansion also 
increases the profitability of two-year projects, it also increases the profitability of the 
longer project relative to that of the shorter project. Initially, two-year projects would be 
chosen only to the extent their return was thought to be at least ten percent higher than 
what one-year projects were thought to offer. After the credit expansion, however, two-
year projects would be chosen so long as they appeared to be but five percent more 
profitable than one-year projects. In consequence, the structure of production would 
lengthen through an expansion in relatively capital intensive activities.  
 The most significant consequence of this boom set in motion by monetary 
expansion is a subsequent collapse that is set in motion by the lengthening in the 
structure of production. This boom is fueled by credit expansion by the banking system, 
as against being fueled by an increase in the supply of saving that would have reflected 
a change in consumer preferences. The production of capital goods expands relative to 
consumer goods. In the forestry illustration above, trees would be allowed to grow 
beyond 20 years, which would require a reduction in the volume of trees converted into 
lumber. But consumer demand for lumber products has not fallen. Indeed, it has 
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probably increased in consequence of the higher aggregate income the boom 
generates. This situation creates an inconsistency between the lengthening of the 
structure of production that credit expansion has set in motion and the unchanged or 
even increased demand for consumer goods within the society. The initial expansion 
will be reversed until the original structure of production is restored: an initial boom will 
be transformed into a bust until restoration is achieved.  
 To give some substantive illustration for an abstract discussion, the initial boom 
that increases the apparent profitability of longer-lived projects might take the form of 
increased investment in saws and other machinery for harvesting trees. Lathes and 
other equipment will be built to provide implements for building that machinery. People 
will be trained and employed to operate that equipment and machinery. At some point, 
however, the owners of enterprises will realize that their plans are not working out as 
they had hoped, and will seek to liquidate what have proved to be bad commercial 
choices. 
 The bust was rendered necessary because of the boom that was generated by 
an increase in the volume of credit that was not supported by an increase in the desire 
of people to save more and consume less. Robert Lucas (1975) developed a similar 
model of a business cycle based on a signal extraction problem where people could not 
distinguish accurately between general or average price changes and changes in 
particular prices. This formulation bore a strong family resemblance to Old Austrian 
macro. Soon thereafter, however, Lucas abandoned that formulation upon recognizing 
that aggregate monetary data are readily available, which rendered problematic any 
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explanation that relied upon any prolonged lack of knowledge about such aggregate 
variables as the supply of money.  
 
Losing the Training Wheels by Embracing Non-equilibrium Theory 
 Traditional Austrian macro starts from solid intuitions about dispersed knowledge 
and the generation of generally coherent structures of production within a market 
economy. Within the context of economic theory in the early 20th century, these ideas 
were on the cutting edge of economic theory at the time, as evidenced by Hayek’s being 
recruited to the London School of Economics. While much has been made of the 
Keynes-Hayek dispute that ended with the domination of Keynesian macro over 
traditional Austrian macro, we doubt that this domination has much to do with the vocal 
ideological overtones that have been spread over this dispute in recent years.  
 To the contrary, we think that traditional Austrian macro lost traction because 
there was never developed a sufficient supply of complementary pieces of intellectual 
capital that would render the Austrian scheme sensible and competitive in the 
continually changing world of economic scholarship. For one thing, the Walrasian notion 
of general equilibrium had given way to new articulations of general equilibrium, mostly 
developed in Vienna. While Keynesian-style macro and Viennese general equilibrium 
did not have many points of direct contract, there were some crossovers and, moreover, 
both schemes of thought operated under a presumption that the contours of an entire 
economy could be apprehended with sufficient clarity to use policy to guide the ship of 
state. While Lucas (1975) originally thought his islands model provided a basis for 
denying that the ship of state could be subject to easy and accurate guidance, he soon 
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reversed himself and fell in line with presumptions that economies are always in 
equilibrium states and are lurching from one such state to another in response to 
exogenous shocks.  
 It seems clear that the presumption that all economic observations pertain to 
states of equilibrium destroys any coherence for the central Austrian intuitions out of 
which traditional Austrian macro emerged. Those intuitions centered on the recognition 
that societies were complex entities of interacting agents which no master puppeteer 
controlled or directed, and so instead comprised a self-ordered system with guidance 
provided by a general adherence to ethical principles and legal rules and processes. 
Hayek’s (1937, 1945) emphasis on the use of distributed knowledge unfortunately came 
after his articulation of macro theory. We are quite confident in asserting that had 
Hayek’s recognition of distributed and incomplete knowledge preceded his treatment of 
macro theory, his macro theory would have taken on a different character and we would 
not now be writing about New Austrian macro theory.  
 One thing we would note, though, is that non-equilibrium theory has nothing to do 
with disequilibrium theory. A disequilibrium theory draws meaning only in conjunction 
with equilibrium theory. In contrast, a non-equilibrium theory simply holds that 
equilibrium is not a useful systemic-level construct for economic theory. Sure, societies 
are generally orderly, though never fully. Moreover, there can be much stability among 
aggregate variables in conjunction with much turbulence among the individual variables 
the constitute those aggregates. Mitchel Resnick (1994) coined the term “centralized 
mindset” to characterize patterns of thought that attribute any observation of orderliness 
to some ordering agent, even though the actual order may be an emergent quality of 
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interactions among the relevant entities. To describe orderliness as denoting a state of 
societal equilibrium is to embrace the centralized mindset, which is surely contrary to all 
Austrian institutions going back to Carl Menger (1871).  
 
Non-equilibrium, Order, and Stylized Systemic Facts 
 Macro theorists often work with stylized facts, and seek to explain those facts. 
Among the facts with which macro theorists seek to explain within the DSGE model are 
the procyclical behavior of real output and real wages, the acyclical behavior of the real 
interest rate, and the countercyclical behavior of unemployment. A skeptic might wonder 
whether what is being explained is some feature of reality or is some creation of the 
national income accounts that might be but a shadow of that reality (Morgenstern 1962). 
Whatever that skeptic might conclude, the central point to notice about those types of 
stylized facts is that they attain significance when reflected against the underlying 
presupposition that systemic equilibrium is the normal state of affairs, with this placidity 
disrupted by exogenous shocks. To be sure, standard macro exhibits curiosity as to 
whether the observed time series reveal a stable trend buffeted by shocks and cycles or 
a continual parade of variations in a real rate of growth.  
 Left out of such examinations are two overwhelming facts that are more than 
stylized. One fact is that societies work: people get fed, clothed, and housed, and 
populations grow. This is an observable fact. The second fact is that there is continual 
volatility within societies. Some businesses prosper, others fail. Quarrels among people 
invariably erupt. Social life has a good deal of roughness and volatility, and by no 
stretch of the imagination is it placid. Change comes not as an exogenous shock but as 
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an emanation from inside a society. That such emanations occur continually, moreover, 
mean that plans are never fully coordinated within a society, so equilibrium can only be 
a fiction.  
 Economies have a generally coordinated quality, in that the quantity of grain 
converted into flour generally matches the amount of bread that bakers want to bake 
and consumers want to buy. Another such fact is that such coordination is never 
complete. The production of grain is subject to variability in the weather. Bread that is 
baked might not reach the store where it was scheduled to be sold because the truck 
carrying the bread was destroyed in a collision with a train. Alternatively, bakers or truck 
drivers might be unionized and go on strike. Furthermore, a good number of consumers 
might think they should reduce their consumption of bread and other products made 
from grain. Things like this happen continually, which means that fluidity and change are 
likewise a stylized fact of economic life.  
 Economic life is generally orderly, but the associated orderliness is not that of 
equilibrium theory. The distinction between equilibrium and orderliness can be 
conveyed by two distinct social configurations with which all readers are familiar. One is 
a parade, the other is a moving crowd of pedestrian rushing to different destinations. 
The parade is an equilibrium configuration, which means that it can be reduced to a 
point on a map and its motion traced. The direction and speed of march is controlled by 
a parade marshal. The crowd of pedestrians leaving a stadium after an event is likewise 
an orderly social configuration. People know how to get from their place in the stadium 
to their desired destination. Unlike the members of a parade, the members of the 
pedestrian crowd will not know the exact path of exit they will take until they start their 
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movement from the stadium. They may have to do such things as walking around a 
crowd of slow moving pedestrians in front of them or having to run to catch a bus that is 
just now pulling into the curb a short distance in front of them.  
 The pedestrian crowd is clearly a different species of societal configuration than 
is the parade. Both configurations are orderly, but the principles that govern that 
orderliness differ between the configurations. The orderliness of the parade is governed 
by the musical and marching talents of the members of the parade, as well as of the 
directional and supervisional talents of the parade marshal. These features have 
nothing to do with the orderliness of the pedestrian crowd. The orderliness of the crowd 
depends on such things as the ability of people to read minds as it were, by anticipating 
other people’s speed and direction of movement so as to avoid collisions. It also 
depends on the degree to which ethical principles regarding courteous action inside 
crowds have been internalized among the pedestrians.  
 In other words, the pedestrian crowd is a self-organized social configuration; it is 
an order of independently acting pedestrians. In contrast, the parade is an organization 
under the direction of a parade marshal. When we come to macro theory, standard 
macro theory implicitly operates with the image of a national economy as an 
economizing entity. What enables construction of that image is the presumption of 
systemic equilibrium, for this presumption reduces the entire set of participants to a 
point on a map, much as the population of some territory can be reduced to a center of 
mass. In sharp contrast, traditional Austrian macro theory sought to theorize in terms of 
a self-ordered social system. While equilibrium theory was the only game in town a 
century ago when Austrian macro got underway, that is no longer the case. Tools of 
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thinking now exist that enable theorists to think about systems of interacting agents 
without imposing some presumption of systemic equilibrium on them.  
 
New Austrian Macro Theory as Creative Systems Theory 
 In conceptualizing the nature of economies, and devising a view of what 
macroeconomics involves, we draw on the theory of complex systems.  There are many 
different definitions of complexity, none of which command universal ascent (Horgan 
1997; Rosser 2015). While acknowledging that the following list of features will not 
accord perfectly with everyone’s idea of the hallmarks of a complex system, we 
nevertheless believe that it captures many of the key aspects of such systems: 
 First, a complex system—more specifically, one that displays organised 
complexity—is composed of a set of elements or parts that are related to each 
other in particular ways. A system is, in Hayek’s words, “a coherent structure of 
causally connected … parts” (Hayek n.d.: 4; also see Page 2011: 24 and Veetil 
and Wagner 2015).2 
 Second, the interactions between the elements, and therefore the system’s 
structure, can be described in terms of sets of rules. The rules in question, which 
can be very simple, require that the parts or elements interact with each other in 
certain ways (Hayek [1967] 2014: 285; also see Page 2011: 25; Colander and 
Kupers 2014: 136-37).  
                                            
2
 Hayek acquires the notion of a ‘system’ from Ludwig von Bertalanffy. For more on Bertalanffy’s influence on Hayek, see Lewis 
(2016a, 2016b). 
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 Third, the system that is formed when the elements relate to, and interact with, 
one another in the appropriate fashion has properties that are qualitatively 
distinct from those possessed by the parts taken in isolation. The existence of 
such emergent properties, as they are known, means that complex “wholes” are 
“’more’ than ‘merely the sum’ of the parts” (Hayek [1964] 2014: 262; Hayek: 
1952a: 147; also see also Page 2011: 25-26; Colander and Kupers 2014: 118, 
129-30).  
 Fourth, these emergent properties are often—though not always—the outcome 
of a process of self-organisation, in the sense that they arise as a consequence 
of the rule-guided responses of the individual agent-parts to their immediate 
environment (rather than from directions issued by a central controller 
possessing an over-arching, synoptic view of the entire system) (Hayek [1967] 
2014: 285; also see Harper and Lewis 2012; Colander and Kupers 2014: 48-53, 
116-18). 
 Fifth, complex systems are hierarchical, with systems of one kind constituting the 
building blocks out of which other kinds of system, possessing their own 
distinctive structure and emergent properties, are formed. For instance, the 
individual people who are the parts from which social systems are made are 
themselves complex systems, formed out of structured arrangements of chemical 
and biological parts (Hayek 1952b). “Societies,” Hayek ([1967] 2014: 288) notes, 
“differ from simply complex structures by the fact that their elements are 
themselves complex structures.” On this view, the world consists of a nested set 
of complex systems, with the ‘lower’ or micro-level systems existing within the 
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context of ‘higher’ or macro-level systems in a hierarchy of levels of complexity 
(Page 2011: 26; Colander and Kupers 2014: 50, 137). 
 Sixth, because the existence of emergent properties depends not only on the 
presence of particular agents but also on their standing in certain relations to one 
another, such properties are ontologically and causally irreducible to the 
properties of the agents of which they are composed. Therefore, attempts to 
explain the properties and behaviour of complex systems by reducing them to the 
properties of their isolated constituent parts are flawed. A satisfactory analysis 
requires knowledge not only of the isolated parts but also of the relations in which 
those parts stand to each other and, therefore, of rules governing how the parts 
relate and interact with one another (Miller and Page 2007: 41-45, 50-51; 
Jepperson and Meyer 2011: 68-69; Lawson 2012: 352; Colander and Kupers 
2014:  47, 50-53; Lewis 2016c). 
 Seventh, emergent properties are often novel in the sense that they could not 
have been predicted ex ante, given people’s knowledge of the properties of the 
component parts (Hayek [1964] 2014: 261-62; also see Anderson 1972). Their 
occurrence is, therefore, a genuine surprise in the sense that it lies outside the 
confines of what people had hitherto imagined might happen (Runde 2009 498-
501; Harper and Lewis 2012: 329-32; Colander and Kupers 2014: 130). On this 
view, novelty is generated not only through exogenous shocks but also 
endogenously, when elements combine so as to give rise to emergent properties. 
The existence of emergent novelty is important because it implies that people 
cannot specify in advance all the possible states of the world that might shape 
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the outcomes to which their actions give rise. People must therefore deal with 
radical uncertainty in the Keynesian or Knightian sense of being unable to assign 
sharp numerical probabilities to the possible consequences of their actions. As a 
result, they cannot act in the expected-utility maximizing fashion postulated by 
rational decision theory.3 
 Eighth, the emergent outcomes displayed by complex systems are best 
understood, not as a static equilibrium, but rather in terms of some alternative, 
more dynamic conception of ‘order’—such as the notion of a ‘basin of 
attraction’—whereby an overall, higher-level pattern is sustained by the oft-
changing, but still structured, (inter)actions of its lower-level constituent parts 
(Page 2011: 27; Colander and Kupers 2014: 49, 92, 118-19, 136-38). Hayek 
explicitly abandoned the notion of equilibrium in the 1960s favour of the notion of 
                                            
3
 Put more formally, the problem to which creative decision-making gives rise is that the state space—that is, the set of states of the 
world that determine the consequences to which a decision-maker’s actions lead—is incomplete. The novelty introduced into the 
economic system by the existence of emergent properties violates one of the key presuppositions of the neoclassical theory of 
rational choice under uncertainty, namely the assumption that people possess from the outset a comprehensive list of all the various 
possible states of the world that are relevant to their decisions. This assumption, which is variously known as the ‘small-world’ or 
‘grand state space’ assumption, rules out the possibility of new, previously unimagined events. In doing so, it helps to ensure that 
the rational actor faces a well-defined decision-problem in which sharp, numerical probabilities can be attached to the 
consequences of the courses of action open to them (Savage: 1954; Gilboa et al. 2012). However, the existence of novel emergent 
properties makes it impossible for people to specify in advance all the possible states of the world in which they might be called 
upon to act, and which might shape the consequences of their actions. Emergence is thus one of the reasons why ‘in many decision 
problems under uncertainty states of the world are neither naturally given nor simply formulated … often even a comprehensive list 
of all possible outcomes is not readily available or easily imagined’ (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995: 606). And where the 
consequences of people’s decisions are determined by events that do not even register as possibilities for the decision-makers in 
question, then the evidential basis for the calculation of meaningful probabilities will be lacking (Shackle 1979: 52-60, 80-84). About 
such matters, as Keynes famously put it, “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability. We simply do not 
know” (1937: 214). 
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‘order’, on the grounds that “an equilibrium presupposes that the facts have 
already been discovered and competition has therefore ceased” ([1968] 1978: 
184). In its place, Hayek proposes the notion of (social) order, understood as “a 
state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related 
to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or 
temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at 
least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” (Hayek 1973: 
36). The advantage the notion of ‘order’ gives, Hayek contends, is that “we can 
meaningfully speak of an order being approved to various degrees, and that 
order can be preserved throughout a process of change” ([1968] 1978: 184; also 
see Caldwell 2004: 226-27 and Lewis and Lewin 2015: 10-11). 
 Ninth, the systems obtaining at each level are adaptive in the sense that they 
adjust to the broader environment in which they are situated via an evolutionary 
process involving variation, selection, and (differential rates of) reproduction (pp. 
50-53, 138 (Hayek [1967] 2014: 282-87, 1979: 153-65; also see Page 2011: 25; 
Colander and Kupers 2014: 136-37, 143, 181-91).  
 
Consider, for example, Hayek’s account of the market economy. For Hayek, a 
market system arises when the relations between people are governed by a set of rules 
that includes both the formal legal rules of contract, property and tort law, and also 
informal moral rules of honesty and promise-keeping. Those rules define various 
positions (e.g. buyers and sellers, creditors and debtors, employers and employees,) 
and set out the rights their occupants enjoy and the obligations they bear. The rules 
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specify in broad terms how the occupants of those positions must relate to one another 
(e.g. debt contracts specify the rights and responsibilities of borrowers and lenders, 
detailing for example the interest rate and repayment schedule for the loan in question). 
In this way, the rules in question define the relations between those positions, specifying 
in broad terms how people should relate to one another in order to form a working 
market system (Hayek 1976: 107-32; also see Lewis 2014, 2015; Wagner 2012a: 13-
16, 27-28, 31-32).4  
 Constituted in this way, the system exhibits properties that differ from those of its 
constituent parts. Prominent amongst these emergent properties is the capacity to 
coordinate people’s plans, even when they are formed independently by individuals in 
the light of their own particular (‘local’) knowledge. What Hayek shows is that, once 
people’s interactions are structured by an appropriate set of rules, a configuration of 
relative prices is generated that—when coupled with the background information 
provided by social rules—enables people to adjust their plans so that they dovetail with 
each other and therefore have a decent chance of coming to fruition (that is, for social 
order to obtain). The coordinative power in question, which Hayek ([1967] 2014: 280) 
refers to as “the overall order of actions”, is an emergent property because it is 
possessed only by a particular whole—namely the free market system that is 
constituted by a group of people whose interactions are structured by a set of rules that 
includes the formal rules of contract, tort and property law, along with informal norms of 
trust and promise-keeping—and not by those individuals taken in isolation. It is ‘more 
than the totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and cannot be 
                                            
4
 For an account of the nature of money, consistent with the system-theoretic position outlined here, see Lawson (2016). 
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reduced to them ... It is more than the mere sum of its parts but presupposes also that 
those elements are related to each other in a particular manner’ (Hayek [1967] 2014: 
282; also see Lewis 2012, 2015; Wagner 2012a: 14, 20, 62, 77, 95-116). 
 The ontological irreducibility of this emergent property implies that it cannot be 
reduced to, or replaced without loss of cognitive content by descriptions of, (the 
properties of) a single (representative) individual and thereby eliminated from causal 
explanations of phenomena of interest (Hoover 2015: 690-92, 695-96, 703). That is to 
say, an eliminative reduction of the emergent entity—whereby references to it are 
entirely replaced by, or reduced to, statements about the properties of its isolated 
component parts—is not possible. The reason is that any causal explanation that rests 
upon the exercise of the emergent, system-level powers of some emergent entity, such 
as an appropriately formed market system, depends not only upon the properties of that 
system’s parts but also upon the way in which they are related to each other; the 
emergent properties arise, and have the causal effects they do, only because of how 
their individual parts are organised. Causal explanations that invoke such powers 
therefore depend critically upon more than the properties of the isolated individual 
elements, namely the relations in which those elements must stand to one another in 
order for the emergent causal power in question to obtain. And it is because of the need 
to refer to the requisite organizing structures and relations that the possibility of 
reduction is foreclosed (Elder-Vass 2010: 24-25, 54-58; Lawson 2012: 350-53).  
 On this view, the key contribution of (macro-)social theory is to investigate how, if 
people’s interactions are characterized by a particular set of social relations, they will 
unintentionally produce some social phenomenon of interest. In Hayek’s words: “It is the 
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so-called wholes, the groups of elements which are structurally connected, which we 
have learned to single out from the totality of observed phenomena ... [and which] are 
the condition for the achievement of many of the things at which we as individuals aim, 
the environment which makes it possible even to conceive of our individual desires and 
which gives us the power to achieve them” (Hayek [1942] 2010: 102-03, [1944] 144.) In 
contrast to the orthodox micro-foundations project, which seeks to reduce macro-
economic phenomena to the behaviour of isolated, atomistic economic agents, the 
approach advocated here would focus on attempting to identify the sets of social 
relations—and the systems of social rules that give rise to them—that underpin 
economic phenomena of interest, as Hayek does in his efforts to explain the possibility 
of social order (Wagner 2012a: 58, 61, 77; Lewis 2016c). So conceived, macro-social 
theory might be thought of as attempting to pose, and to answer, questions of the form, 
‘What must the overall institutional structure of the economy be like in order for 
microeconomic phenomena of interest to be possible?’ Such an approach is seeking to 
uncover what one might call the ‘macro-foundations of microeconomics’, in the sense of 
attempting to identity the systems of social rules that underpin microeconomic 
phenomena of interest (as well as how people’s actions lead either to the reproduction 
or transformation of those structures) (Smithin 2004; Wagner 2012a: 51, 137-59, 2012b: 
435).  
On this view, the central focus of macro-theory is the institutions in virtue of 
which the things conventionally regarded as macroeconomic phenomena exist. In 
emphasizing the importance of investigating whether the institutional framework or 
system of rules, within which economic activity takes place is such that people’s 
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(inter)actions generate as emergent properties the information and incentives required 
for people to coordinate their plans, we believe the new Austrian macroeconomics is 
consistent with, and a fruitful development of, Buchanan’s ([1964] 1999) account of the 
central concern of economics as being the examination of the institutions that can 
facilitate voluntary, mutually advantageous exchange and thereby support the market 
order or catallaxy. Central to such an approach would be the examination of the 
comparative properties of different configurations of institutions, or rule systems, with 
particular regard to their capacity to sustain the emergent coordinative powers in 
question (Wagner 2016; Lewis 2013). 
In considering the subject-matter of new Austrian macroeconomics, as 
understood here, the emphasis on the structure of production mentioned above 
suggests that special attention ought to be devoted to those factors governing the 
orderly allocation of resources over time (that is, between present and future 
consumption). In that case, a key question for macroeconomics becomes which set of 
institutions, or system of rules, will generate the information and incentives required to 
coordinate the plans of savers and investors. And, in keeping with the comparative 
institutional perspective outlined in the previous paragraph, significant issues here 
concern the relative capacities of different systems of rules for governing the supply of 
money and credit to generate the incentives and information required to ensure that the 
plans of banks concerning how much money and credit to supply are well coordinated 
with the demand arising from consumers and businesses. Put slightly differently, the 
goal of macroeconomics thus conceived is to identify the constitutional provisions 
required to facilitate a well-functioning monetary order, in which people have reliable 
26 
 
expectations about the future value of money and in which, as a result, (changes in) 
money prices provide reflect (changes in) the relative scarcities of resources with 
sufficient accuracy for economic calculation and purposeful activity to be possible. At 
issue here will be questions such as whether there is a need for a distinctive monetary 
constitution, beyond the general constitutional protections provided by the rules of 
contract, property and tort law, in order to ensure the emergence of the requisite 
monetary regime, and the merits of free banking.5 In this way, the existence of 
emergent properties can justify a distinctive sub-discipline of macroeconomics. 
Whereas the dominant approach to macroeconomics over the past three to four 
decades has emphasised the need to provide micro-foundations for macroeconomics—
that is, to show how relations amongst macroeconomic variables can ultimately be 
reduced to, and explained solely in terms of, the behaviour of individual economic 
actors—the possibility of emergence suggests there is a distinctive subject-matter for 
macroeconomics, centring on the tasks of identifying and illuminating the social 
relations, and associated systems of rules, that must be in place for social order—
perhaps most notably, given our emphasis on the structure of production described 
above, the orderly allocation of resources between present and future consumption—be 
possible. 
 In pursuing the objective of identifying the macro-institutional foundations of 
microeconomics, we do not of course mean to suggest that those social rules should be 
                                            
5
 Recent examples of the kind of work we have in mind, in addition to the essays in this special issue, are Buchanan (2010), Horwitz 
(2011), Smith et al. (2011), Koppl (2014), Salter (2014), Wagner (2014), Boettke and Smith (2016), and Paniagua (2016). 
Antecedents include Buchanan [1962] 1999, Buchanan and R. Wagner ([1977] 2000), Hayek ([1978] 1999), and Selgin and White 
1994). 
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reified, their (continued) existence simply being assumed or taken for granted. On the 
contrary, as Hayek for example makes clear, it is necessary to couple the kind of 
explanatory endeavour described above, which involves the (static) analysis of how 
when people’s (inter)actions are structured by a given system of rules they produce an 
emergent outcome of interest, with a more dynamic account of how the relevant system 
of rules comes about in the first place (Hayek [1967] 2014: 284-87). The specific 
account offered by Hayek is, of course, one in which the relevant systems of rules arise, 
are maintained, or cease to exist through a process of cultural evolution in which 
systems of rules are selected according to how effectively they coordinative the plans of 
the members of the groups who subscribe to them (Gaus 2006; Lewis 2015).  However, 
the general picture of the relationship between social structure and human agency that 
underwrites our account of how the systems of rules that facilitate coordinated action 
does not hinge on the merits of Hayek’s specific, and controversial account, which is 
mentioned here principally for illustrative purposes. Whatever the merit and demerits of 
that particular theory, the broad account of the structure-agency relationship 
underpinning the new Austrian macroeconomics suggests that they are mutually 
dependent or recursively related, so that each is both a necessary condition for, and 
also a consequence of, the other: pre-existing social rules facilitate intentional human 
agency, as when entrepreneurs rely on the legal system in order to draw up business 
contracts; while the continued existence of those rules depends on people continuing to 
make use of them when they act. 
On this view, just as there is a need for a macro-foundations of microeconomics, 
involving the examination of how certain sets of social rules facilitate coordinated 
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activity, so too is it equally necessary to study the micro-foundations of 
macroeconomics, rightly understood as involving the examination of how people’s 
actions, structured by the relevant system of rules, lead to the reproduction or 
transformation of the rules in question.6 Just as there is no question of macro-level 
variables being explained simply by reducing them to the properties of isolated agents, 
and in the most extreme case to the choices of a single representative agent,7 so too 
does new Austrian macroeconomics eschew efforts to explain macro-level phenomena 
simply by reference to other macro-level facts.8 New Austrian macro theory would work 
within an emergent motif, where what standard macro theories label as data are viewed 
rather as emergent resultants of the structured interaction between micro-level agents. 
This recognition entails a scheme of thought where there is two-way interaction 
between micro and macro levels of theorizing, encapsulating both the search for micro-
foundations, correctly interpreted as requiring an understanding of how macro-
phenomena arise out of human (inter)action, and also an effort to conceptualize how 
those emergent macro-structures, by organizing how people interact, in turn shape 
                                            
6 One can put this point slightly differently, in terms different kinds of analysis of emergent properties. One might give a static or 
synchronic account of how at a given point in time how the interaction of a particular set of parts, organized so that they stand in 
certain relations to one another, gives rise to the existence of a particular emergent property (that is to say, one might give an 
account of how the parts, suitably organized, constitute a causal mechanism whose operation generates the emergent property in 
question). However, because the presence both of the parts and also of the relations that organize them into the relevant 
mechanism are contingent matters, and so cannot be taken for granted, a fuller analysis of an emergent property also requires a 
dynamic or diachronic account of how the requisite configuration of parts and relations comes about (Lewis 2015). 
7
 For more on the pathologies of the representative agent model, see Kirman (1992, 2010). 
8
 Latour (2005) explores the shortcomings of approaches that seek to explain macro-level social facts simply in terms of other, 
macro-level facts, without considering the interaction between micro-level elements that constitutes the underlying causal 
mechanism linking macro-level phenomena.   
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people’s actions. Combining these two lines of thought leads to what might be 
described as a transformational model of social activity, according to which the 
relationship between structure and agency is one of non-reductionist co-development: 
both social structure and human agency possess their own sui generis, emergent 
causal powers, so although each depends on the other neither has ontological or 
analytical priority (Lewis 2008: 844-51; Lewis and Lewin 2015: 10-12; Wagner 2012a: 1-
2, 2012b; Veetil and Wagner 2015).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 To set forth a manifesto for a research program has been no part of our 
intension. Our intention has been rather to uncover some analytical challenges and 
opportunities that we think hold potential for bringing Austrian intuitions and conceptions 
once again into the foreground of thinking about the systemic properties of different 
schemes of economic interaction. There is much work to be done by numerous people 
with varied talents. The papers presented below by these astute and energetic students 
of civilization (Dekker 2016) have flashed some light into the vast uncharted territory 
that must be explored truly to understand the moral and institutional facets of self-
governing societies.  
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